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Abstract: How effective are rewards (for cooperation) and punishment (for noncooperation) as tools to 
promote cooperation in social dilemmas or situations when immediate self-interest and longer term 
collective interest conflict? What variables can promote the impact of these incentives? Although such 
questions have been examined, social and behavioral scientists provide different answers. To date, 
there is no theoretical and/or quantitative review of rewards and punishments as incentives for 
cooperation in social dilemmas. Using a novel interdependence-theoretic framework, we propose that 
rewards and punishments should both promote cooperation, and we identify 2 variables—cost of 
incentives and source of incentives—that are predicted to magnify the effectiveness of these 
incentives in promoting cooperation. A meta-analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that rewards 
and punishments exhibited a statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation (d = 0.51 and 0.70, 
respectively). The effectiveness of incentives was stronger when the incentives were costly to 
administer, compared to free. Centralization of incentives did not moderate the effect size. 
Punishments were also more effective during iterated dilemmas when participants continued to 
interact in the same group, compared to both (a) iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group 
after each trial and (b) one-shot dilemmas. We also examine several other potential moderators, such 
as iterations, partner matching, group size, country, and participant payment. We discuss broad 
conclusions, consider implications for theory, and suggest directions for future research on rewards 
and punishment in social dilemmas. 
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Good and evil, reward and punishment, are the only motives to a rational creature: these are 
the spur and reins whereby all mankind are set on work, and guided. 
—John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education 
If people are good only because they fear punishment, and hope for reward, then we are a 
sorry lot indeed. 
—Albert Einstein, quoted in All the Questions You Ever Wanted to Ask American Atheists 
 
Reward and punishment are incentives that tend to capture strong views of human nature, as well as 
beliefs regarding public policy, political structures, and organizational systems. Some, like John 
Locke, believe that incentives are effective tools that help regulate individuals in their pursuit of self-
interest. Others, like Albert Einstein, believe that incentives may undermine autonomy, authenticity, 
and, most importantly, the true motive to be good. One of the strongest views was expressed by 
Thomas Hobbes (1651), who argued that people who want collective interest to triumph over self-
interest should support Leviathan, an authority or government that enforces social order. More 
recently, Hardin (1968) noted that coercion may be the most effective tool to encourage people to 
sacrifice self-interest for collective benefit. These ideas ignited interdisciplinary research across the 
biological and social sciences on the effect of incentives as a solution to cooperation (Edney & 
Harper, 1978; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Lynn & Oldenquist, 1986; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992; 
Sigmund, 2007; Yamagishi, 1986). This research has generally supported the position of Hobbes and 
Hardin: Incentives for cooperation do encourage people to sacrifice their self-interest for collective 
benefit (e.g., Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009). 
Aligned with Albert Einstein’s view, however, other perspectives suggest that incentives may 
undermine cooperation.1 For example, incentives may undermine autonomy and the intrinsic 
motivation to cooperate (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000), which can reduce persistence in 
cooperation (Cardenas, Stranlund, & Willis, 2002; Lepper & Greene, 1978), result in resistance to 
comply with the external forces (Brehm, 1966), and/or influence a decline in cooperation if the 
incentive is no longer present (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999). Social incentives can also evoke costly 
retaliation (Denant-Boemont, Masclet, & Noussair, 2007; Hopfensitz & Rueben, 2009; Oliver, 1980), 
transform an ethical decision into a business decision (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 1999), and even undermine trust in others (Chen, Pillutla, & Yao, 2009; Mulder, van Dijk, 
De Cremer, & Wilke, 2006a), and thus create their own necessity (Mulder, van Dijk, Wilke, & De 
Cremer, 2005). Although these disadvantages of incentives may not be a threat to their effectiveness 
as long as they are strong and inescapable (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999), it is often unfeasible and/or 
undesirable to install strong incentives for cooperation and a watertight monitoring system. Whereas 
incentives can exert negative psychological effects (e.g., reactance, a lack of intrinsic obligation and 
distrust), one cannot expect an incentive system to be an all-encompassing and long-term solution to 
social dilemmas. Instead, one should understand under what conditions incentives are most effective. 
The major purpose of the present meta-analytic review is to provide a comprehensive analysis of three 
broad questions. First, do incentives to cooperate promote and sustain cooperation in small group 
social dilemmas? Second, what variables might influence the effectiveness of incentives? Finally, do 
reward and punishment differ in their ability to promote and sustain cooperation? As we discuss 
shortly, we adopt an interdependence-theoretical analysis for understanding whether incentives might 
promote cooperation and when these incentives might be especially effective. 
 
                                                     
1
 In this article, we use the term incentives to refer to both rewards and punishments of behavior in social 
dilemmas. Moreover, we use the term effectiveness of incentives to refer to the positive effect of incentives on 
cooperation in social dilemmas. We are not referring to the overall efficiency of incentives as a solution to social 
dilemmas. Although incentives may be effective at enhancing cooperation in social dilemmas, incentives could 
still remain a very inefficient solution to a social dilemma due to the cost of monitoring behavior and providing 
the incentive. 
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Social Dilemmas and the Free-Rider Problem 
 
Social dilemmas are situations of interdependence characterized by a conflict between immediate self-
interest and longer term collective interest (Dawes, 1980; Van Lange & Joireman, 2008). Many social 
dilemmas take the form of either a public goods dilemma or a resource dilemma. In a public goods 
dilemma, people decide how much to contribute to the installment, maintenance, or improvement of a 
public good, such as paying for public transportation, contributing to a group project, or engaging in 
teamwork (Gächter & Herrmann, 2009). Similarly, in a resource dilemma, people decide how much to 
take from a shared resource. For example, fishermen may decide how many fish to catch in an area 
where certain fish are endangered, knowing that, over time, overharvesting will lead to depletion of 
that particular fish (Komorita & Parks, 1995). 
One major challenge is the free-rider problem. In social dilemmas, it is individually tempting to 
contribute as little as possible to public goods or take as much as possible in resource dilemmas, while 
enjoying the benefits of others’ cooperation, such as the provision of a public good or access to a 
sustainable resource. To reduce free riding and encourage cooperation, authorities often provide 
rewards (e.g., public recognition) and/or punishments (e.g., fines). Additionally, groups and 
collectives often develop social norms that are informally enforced to regulate individual behavior and 
promote cooperation. How can one best understand the effect of these incentives on cooperation in 
social dilemmas? 
 
An Interdependence Analysis of Rewards and Punishment in Social Dilemmas 
 
Since Skinner (1953), research has shown that reinforcements and punishments are important forms 
of situational feedback that promote learning and performance (for an overview, see Kazdin, 2001). 
Performance and learning are outcomes that are relevant to the individual, and they typically serve 
one’s own self-interest in the shorter term, in the case of performance (e.g., receiving a high grade), or 
longer term, in the case of learning (e.g., mastering a particular skill). In contrast, incentives in the 
context of social dilemmas are conceptually distinct, in that they serve as motivators of cooperation 
and include both (a) a cost to oneself and (b) a benefit to all other members of the group. Moreover, 
the benefit for others, in absolute terms, is greater than the cost to oneself. Thus, in social dilemmas, 
incentives seek to motivate people to act against their immediate self-interest so as to serve the 
collective interest. 
Classic and contemporary formulations of interdependence theory provide a conceptual framework 
that acknowledges the interdependence between the self and others, as well as a domain of situations 
in which self-interest and collective interest conflict (Kelley et al., 2003; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; 
Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). More generally, interdependence theory is a broad theory of the 
structure of interpersonal situations and how these situations afford the expression of certain motives 
among individuals. From this perspective, we propose two broad principles that are useful for 
understanding the effectiveness of incentives in social dilemmas. 
A first principle focuses on the interpersonal motives of the self. People may be strongly focused on 
enhancing immediate outcomes for self (direct self-interest) but may also take into account broader 
considerations, such as the goal to minimize (absolute) differences in outcomes for self and other 
(egalitarianism or fairness), the goal to enhance outcomes for the collective, or the goal to enhance 
outcomes in the future. The idea that these broader considerations (referred to as transformations by 
Kelley et al., 2003) can shape behavior and interactions has received strong support in past research 
(for an overview, see Van Lange, De Cremer, van Dijk, & Van Vugt, 2007). Specifically, this first 
principle, which we term the given matrix thesis, states that an individual’s initial preferences are 
shaped by the direct concrete outcomes of an interaction for the self (e.g., the monetary payoffs for 
the self during social dilemmas). Although motives other than direct self-interest might come into 
play, interdependence theory suggests that self-interest represents a powerful motive in 
interdependence situations. This thesis is shared by other theories and frameworks and has the 
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important implication that people should be responsive to structural changes in interdependence 
patterns underlying social dilemmas (Kelley et al., 2003; Olson, 1965; Yamagishi, 1986, 
1988).2 Importantly, incentives can affect the structure of outcomes in the given matrix by enhancing 
the correspondence of outcomes and reducing the conflict of interests between participants in the 
dilemma. That is, when incentives are present, there is less discrepancy between self-interest and 
collective interests compared to when incentives are absent. Specifically, both rewards and 
punishments of equal magnitude will result in a similar effect, rendering cooperation in the self-
interest of each individual in the dilemma (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; see also Komorita & Parks, 
1995). Indeed, prior research has suggested that reward of cooperation or punishment of 
noncooperation results in greater levels of cooperation in social dilemmas relative to when incentives 
are absent (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Mulder, 2008; Ostrom et al., 1992; Parks, 2000; Rand et al., 2009; 
Yamagishi, 1986). Thus, following the given matrix thesis of interdependence theory, incentives are 
predicted to increase cooperation (Hypothesis 1). 
Interdependence theory extends many other theories by assuming that self-interest is not the only 
interpersonal motive that is relevant to interdependence situations, such as social dilemmas. It also 
assumes that people might adopt broader motives, including other-regarding motives, and that people 
are oriented toward understanding others’ behavior in terms of such motives. Thus, a second principle 
focuses on the perceived interpersonal motives of interdependent others. This principle states not only 
that people might adopt broader motives, including other-regarding motives in situations of 
interdependence, but also that people are oriented toward understanding others’ behavior in terms of 
such motives. For example, people are oriented toward understanding whether self-interest or other-
regarding motives provide the most plausible account of behavior. To illustrate, strong deviations 
from self-interested preferences by Mary that benefit John promote John’s trust. This trust, in turn, 
may enhance John’s pro-partner behavior, which may affect Mary’s trust and pro-partner behavior as 
well. Such dynamics explain why trust and commitment in relationships can be maintained and grow 
over time (Wieselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew, 1999; see also Murray & Holmes, 2009). As we 
suggest below, this principle can help identify features of the situation that can make incentives more 
or less effective at enhancing cooperation. 
 
What Factors Promote the Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment? 
 
According to an interdependence-theoretical analysis, the perceived motives by others are likely to 
influence the effectiveness of incentives. Generally speaking, incentives should be more effective if 
the goals of those who administer incentives are perceived as aimed at enhancing collective interest, 
rather than their own interests. That is, incentives should be more effective to the degree that they are 
perceived as guided by cooperative motives (e.g., Kelley et al., 2003; Mulder & Nelissen, 2011; Van 
Lange & Rusbult, in press). This premise has implications for two variables and their impact on the 
incentives–cooperation relationship: (a) the cost of incentives and (b) the source of incentives. 
Cost of Incentives 
According to an interdependence perspective, incentives should be more effective to the extent that 
incentives are seen as genuine tools that others use to promote collective interests. When others are 
expending greater costs to provide reward (for cooperation) and deliver punishments (for 
noncooperation), people are likely to believe that these others seek to promote cooperation, rather 
than their self-interests. In fact, research suggests that people who are genuinely concerned about 
collective outcomes tend to sacrifice self-interest to provide punishment, with the punishment largely 
directed toward noncooperators (Egas & Riedl, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Herrmann, Thöni, 
& Gächter, 2008; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003). That is, such punishment is costly to 
                                                     
2
 The notion that self-interest represents a powerful motive is shared by classic theorizing in the social and 
behavioral sciences. Also, the assumption that other-regarding motives might also be relevant to explain 
behaviour in interdependence situations is increasingly acknowledged in several contemporary models and 
theories of social preferences and human cooperation (e.g., Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Van Lange, 1999). 
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the punisher, who is not simply acting in self-interest. Thus, cooperation should increase as a function 
of group members’ perceptions of a linkage between the costliness of incentives provided by others 
and those others’ cooperative motives. We aim to provide more conclusive evidence relevant to the 
prediction that costly incentives will increase cooperation in social dilemmas, compared to when 
incentives are free to administer (Hypothesis 2). 
 
The Source of Incentives 
Past research has examined two distinct sources: decentralized incentives, which are provided by 
individuals who participate in the dilemma themselves and have equal roles, 
versus centralized incentives, which are provided by some kind of external force, often an authority 
figure (e.g., a government, manager, teacher, or the experimenter). Any difference in perceived 
cooperative motives between similar-status ingroup members and a central authority may influence 
the effectiveness of the incentive system. 
In fact, power is often associated with self-interest motives. As power increases, people have been 
shown to be more concerned with their self-interest (Keltner, Langner, & Allison, 2006), feel a sense 
of entitlement (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005, 2008), and tend to become less cooperative in social 
dilemmas (De Cremer & van Dijk, 2005; Samuelson & Allison, 1994; van Dijk & De Cremer, 2006). 
Moreover, people in a position of (unilateral) power tend to be trusted less than those who hold equal 
power and have similar roles (Kramer, 1999; Muthusamy & White, 2006; Van Vugt, Hogan, & 
Kaiser, 2008). People are also more inclined to cooperate with ingroup members with similar status 
(e.g., Kalkhoff & Barnum, 2000; Oldmeadow, Platow, Foddy, & Anderson, 2003; Turner, 1991) and 
those who share similar characteristics (Parks, Sanna, & Berel, 2001). Additionally, people tend to 
react more positively to power when this influence is mutual and not the result of a single power 
holder (Carpenter & Matthews, 2009; Muthusamy & White, 2006). Therefore, dispensers of 
incentives who are not part of the social dilemma may be seen as more strongly guided by self-interest 
motives (e.g., Komorita, Sheposh, & Braver, 1968; Kramer, 1999; Mulder, Verboon, & De Cremer, 
2009), fueling the perception that they are administering an incentive for their own personal gains 
rather than concern for the collective outcome. Thus, we predict centralized incentive systems—
provided by authority figures and not direct participants—will be less effective than decentralized 
incentive systems (Hypothesis 3). 
 
Overview of the Meta-Analysis 
 
We report a meta-analytic review of the effect of both rewards and punishment on cooperation in 
experimental social dilemmas. In so doing, we examine the above-noted predictions derived from 
interdependence theory. Specifically, we estimate the overall average effect of both rewards and 
punishments on cooperation and then test whether these relationships are moderated by the cost and 
source of incentives. Besides testing the interdependence perspective, we also consider several other 
perspectives about the differences between reward and punishment. Specifically, we examine if 
punishments are more effective compared to rewards in the short term, while also considering the 
possibility that rewards are more effective than punishments in the long term. Last, we examine the 
moderating role of the type of dilemma, number of iterations, group size, cost-to-fine ratio, participant 
payment, partner matching, and country of participants. 
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Method 
 
Search for Studies 
We searched several databases for published studies, including PsycINFO, PsycARTICLES, Econlit, 
Google Scholar, Social Sciences Citation Index, Web of Science, Worldwide Political Science 
Abstracts, and Dissertations Online. We searched the entire text of English written journal articles by 
using the terms punishment, rewards, incentive, reinforcer, and sanction along with social dilemmas, 
public goods dilemmas, resource dilemmas, and voluntary contributions mechanism. We searched the 
references of all research and review articles for relevant studies. We also contacted over 150 
researchers who attended the 2007 and 2009 International Conference for Social Dilemmas for 
published and unpublished data. We also posted a call for data to the Economic Science Association 
methods discussion group (http://groups.google.com/group/esa-discuss). Finally, we contacted several 
authors who had published papers in the past 5 years with requests for additional data. 
 
Study Criteria 
There were several criteria for the selection of studies. First, studies had to be conducted on adult 
participants (ages 18 years and above). Second, all studies had to examine the effect of either a reward 
or punishment on cooperation in a social dilemma. We included only studies that compared a reward 
or punishment condition to a control condition and excluded conditions when both reward and 
punishments were used simultaneously. The incentives could have been delivered by a fine imposed 
by the experimenter, by providing participants an opportunity to sanction each other during the 
dilemma, or by a leader in the dilemma. The social dilemma could be either a public goods or give-
some dilemma, prisoner’s dilemma, resource or take-some dilemma, or other possible matrix games 
that included some degree of a conflict between individual and collective interests. Specifically, 
mutual cooperation had to yield higher outcomes than mutual defection, and according to the 
individual, defection always yielded a higher personal outcome than cooperation (Dawes, 1980). We 
excluded games that did not fit the strict criteria above, including ultimatum bargaining games, 
negotiations, trust games, and dictator games.3 We applied these criteria to evaluate potentially 
relevant studies, which uncovered a total of 103 papers. However, some papers were excluded 
because they either did not have a control condition or failed to report the statistics necessary to 
calculate the effect size. This resulted in a total of 76 papers that contained 187 effect sizes (150 
published and 37 unpublished). 
 
Coding Procedure 
Cost of incentive: Costly versus free 
Many experiments have participants make a payment to either punish or reward other group members. 
However, some experiments do not include a cost for providing incentives to fellow participants (e.g., 
voting if a player should be punished, experimenter provides a sanctioning system free of charge to 
the participants). Therefore, we coded whether the incentive was costly (k = 116), free (k = 70), or not 
determined (k = 1). 
 
                                                     
3
 We did not include these paradigms because they (a) do not share the same game theoretical or 
interdependence features (e.g., a dictator game represents unilateral dependence rather than interdependence), 
(b) add qualities that make the game different (e.g., most negotiation games include an element of coordination, 
represent incomplete information about their partner’s preferences, may be time bound, and can be 
asymmetrical, in that the roles of the players differ), or (c) make salient psychological states or orientations that 
are somewhat different from social dilemmas (e.g., the trust game calls for trust, less so for cooperation; the 
ultimatum bargaining appears to challenge violations of fairness). Furthermore, they have been primarily used in 
a two-person format rather than an n-person format. 
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Source of incentives: Centralized versus decentralized 
In social dilemma experiments with incentives, researchers often allow participants in the dilemma an 
option to either reward or punish their partners. During the first stage of these experiments, 
participants make their choices in the dilemma. In the second stage, participants are provided 
feedback about the choices of their partners and given the opportunity to pay or vote toward the end 
of rewarding or punishing other members. For example, a participant might pay $1 to reduce the 
earnings of another member by $3. In these experiments, punishment is confidential, and participants 
are not informed which of the other partners paid to reduce their own earnings. In other experiments, 
however, an incentive system is implemented by the experimenter that either rewards cooperators or 
punishes noncooperators (e.g., the earnings of the least cooperative member are reduced by a specific 
amount). This second scenario is much like a fine for noncooperation. These studies often vary in 
their probability of defection being detected. We coded if the incentive was decentralized, that is, 
delivered by the participants in the social dilemma (k = 102); centralized, meaning that an incentive 
mechanism (e.g., a fine) was imposed by the experimenter (k = 83); or not applicable (k = 2). 
Cost-to-fine ratio in punishment studies 
In many studies, punishment varied not only in cost to the punisher but also in the impact it had on the 
punished. In some studies, participants paid one monetary unit to decrease their partner’s earnings by 
one monetary unit (k = 6). However, in other studies, one monetary unit reduced the partner’s 
earnings by either two (k = 11), three (k = 59), or four (k = 5) monetary units. In several other studies, 
each monetary unit purchased a 10% reduction in a group member’s earnings (k = 10). 
Group size 
We coded group size as a continuous variable. The mode of group size was a four-person group (k = 
88). Excluding one outlier (a 1,000-person group), the mean of group size is a four-person group, and 
the range is between two- and 16-person groups. 
Type of experimental protocol: Partner design versus stranger design 
A common method of punishment protocol included in this meta-analysis is the paradigm developed 
by Fehr and Gächter (2000). Fehr and Gächter had participants play an iterated four-person public 
goods dilemma allowing participants an opportunity to punish their partners in the dilemma after each 
trial. Originally, Fehr and Gächter composed two conditions—the stranger design and the partner 
design. In the stranger design, participants play the same dilemma for several trials but are randomly 
assigned to a new group after each trial. In the partner design, however, participants remain 
anonymous but are not reassigned to a new group after each trial and remain in the same group for the 
entire experiment. Of the studies that employed the Fehr and Gächter protocol, we coded if the study 
used the partner design (k = 62) or the stranger design (k = 32). 
One-shot versus iterated dilemma 
In social dilemma studies, participants are allowed to interact only once, or the dilemma may occur 
repeatedly for several iterations. The sample of studies includes both one-shot (k = 54) and iterated 
(k = 133) dilemmas. We also coded the number of iterations as a continuous variable (M = 12, Mdn = 
10, mode = 10). 
Type of dilemma 
In this analysis, public goods dilemmas (k = 139) were the most common dilemma, followed by the 
prisoner’s dilemma (k = 19) and the resource dilemma (k = 11). Also, a few effect sizes were from 
studies that used several of these dilemmas coded above (k = 6) or used a different type of social 
dilemma (k =12). Additionally, the social dilemma paradigms in this sample of studies involved either 
decisions about real money (k = 168) or decisions in hypothetical scenarios (k = 19). 
Country of participants 
The studies included in our analysis were conducted in 27 different countries. Most studies were 
conducted in the United States (k = 63), the Netherlands (k = 48), Australia (k = 13), Switzerland (k = 
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13), England (9), Japan (k = 7), and Russia (k = 6). Other countries represented include Austria, 
China, Greece, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Ukraine, and several more. The country of each effect 
size is labeled in Table 1. 
 
Overview of Analysis 
We use the d statistic as the measure of effect size. This value is the difference between the mean 
levels of cooperation in the treatment and control conditions divided by the pooled standard deviation. 
This is a common measure of effect size for examining the effect of a manipulated dichotomous 
variable (incentives vs. control) on a continuous dependent variable (degree of cooperation). A 
positive d value indicates greater cooperation in the reward/punishment condition, relative to a control 
condition. When the means and standard deviations were not directly reported, the d values were 
calculated using the sample size along with the F score, t value, or chi-square value (see Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001). 
Several studies allowed us to code multiple effect sizes. For example, one study could include a 
control condition and then three separate punishment treatments, affording the calculation of three 
separate effect sizes. However, the effect sizes are nonindependent because they share several 
methodological features as well as the same control condition. Therefore, we applied Cooper’s (1998) 
shifting-units-of-analysis approach to handling nonindependent effect sizes when conducting 
analyses. Using this approach, we averaged over all the effects abstracted from a single study. This 
creates a single effect size for each study with multiple nonindependent effect sizes. These combined 
effect sizes are then used in each analysis. 
To begin our analysis, we first estimate the average effect sizes for both punishment and reward with 
cooperation using a random-effects model. A fixed-effects model is inappropriate because we assume 
that we do not have the entire population of studies and that there will be systematic between-study 
variation. Specifically, we are assuming that the effect of incentives on cooperation in social 
dilemmas will have systematic variation that will be explained, in part, by the study characteristics we 
mentioned above (see also Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We then assess the amount of estimated variation 
in the effect size distribution using several indicators of heterogeneity (T, T2, and I2) and homogeneity 
(Q) of variance. We then apply a mixed-effects model when examining moderators because a random-
effects model assumes only random variation in the effect size distribution. However, one limitation 
of a mixed-effects model is that it may be too conservative and result in Type II errors, compared to a 
fixed-effects model (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We report any discrepancies between fixed- and mixed-
effects analyses. Finally, because several of the moderators are correlated, we conclude our analyses 
with a multiple regression model with several study characteristics predicting the effect size. Analyses 
were conducted using the Hedges and Olkin (1985) method with comprehensive meta-analysis. 
 
Results 
 
The Effects of Punishment Versus Reward on Cooperation 
We begin our analysis by reporting the main effects of both punishment and rewards on cooperation 
in social dilemmas and then comparing the effectiveness between these incentives. Throughout the 
Results section, we report the effects of punishment first, and then rewards, because punishments have 
received the most attention in prior research and we have obtained a much larger sample of 
punishment effect sizes (k = 154) compared to reward effect sizes (k = 33). 
Punishment and cooperation 
Studies examining the punishment–cooperation relationship used in the meta-analysis, including their 
effect sizes and study characteristics, are listed in Table 1. Prior to analyses, we created a single 
averaged effect size for studies that reported multiple nonindependent effect sizes, which reduced the 
sample of effect sizes (k = 126). As expected, punishment had a medium-sized, positive effect on 
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cooperation in social dilemmas (d = 0.70, 95% confidence interval [CI] lower limit [ LL] = 0.60, 
upper limit [ UL] = 0.80, 90% prediction interval LL = 0.18, UL = 1.58). The indicators of 
heterogeneity of the effect size distribution suggest that there is variation in the true effect size 
distribution (T2 = .28, T = .53) and that a substantial amount of this variation can be explained by 
between-study differences (I2 = 90.55%). Moreover, the overall punishment–cooperation effect size 
distribution contained more variation than would be expected by chance, Q(125) = 1,322, p < .001. 
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This effect size estimate could have been influenced by publication bias, as the majority of studies 
included in the analysis were published studies. To examine the possibility of a publication bias, we 
first considered the funnel plot where all studies were plotted according to their sample size and 
standard error. In this plot, we observed a reasonable amount of symmetrical dispersion of the effect 
sizes, but to examine this more formally, we used Duval and Tweedie’s (2000) trim and fill approach. 
This method examines the symmetry of the effect sizes in the funnel plot and removes the most 
extreme small studies from either side of the plot while recalculating the average effect size at each 
iteration until symmetry is achieved. If there is publication bias, then we can expect that this approach 
will remove studies above the estimated overall effect size and provide an estimate of a lower 
estimated effect size without publication bias. Through this approach, we found that there were no 
studies that were trimmed above the estimated effect size. Asymmetry did exist, however, 
characterized by missing studies below the estimated effect size. The trim and fill approach added 11 
studies above the estimated effect size and recalculated an estimated average effect size larger than 
the original estimated effect size (d = 0.81, 95% CI LL = 0.69, UL = 0.93). Moreover, we found a 
statistically significant Egger’s regression intercept, intercept = 3.58, t(124) = 6.29, p < .001, which 
indicates bias in the data. Taken together, these results suggest that the sample did not contain a 
publication bias that is usually characterized by missing null findings. Instead, there seems to be a 
slight bias of missing studies with larger effect sizes. 
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As an additional measure of publication bias, we also estimated Orwin’s (1983) fail-safe N, a statistic 
designed to estimate the number of unpublished findings with null results necessary to reduce the 
overall effect size to nonsignificance (d = 0.05). We found that Orwin’s fail-safe Nis 1,058. According 
to Hedges and Olkin (1985), to assure confidence in the results, Orwin’s fail-safe N should be greater 
than 5 times the number of studies (here, 5 × 126 = 630) plus 10 (630 + 10 = 640). Thus, we can 
conclude that the estimated average effect size for the punishment–cooperation relationship is robust 
to the presence of unpublished null results. 
 
Rewards and cooperation 
Table 2 reports the sample of studies included in this analysis that examined the rewards–cooperation 
association (k = 33). Rewards had a medium-sized, positive effect on cooperation in social dilemmas 
(d = 0.51, 95% CI LL = 0.31, UL = 0.70, 90% prediction interval LL = 0.27, UL= 1.29). Examining 
the heterogeneity of the effect size distribution indicates that there is variation in the true effect size 
(T2 = .20, T = .45) and that much of this variation can be explained by between-study differences (I2 = 
80.81%). The overall effect size distribution for these studies also contained more variation than 
would be expected by chance alone, Q(24) = 130.24, p < .001.  
 
 
 
  
Reward, punishment, and cooperation 13 
 
Considering the possibility of a publication bias, we examined the funnel plot using Duval and 
Tweedie’s (2000) trim and fill approach. This approach did indicate some asymmetry in the effect 
size, but this asymmetry was again the result of missing effect sizes larger than the overall estimated 
effect size. This approach did not remove any studies above the estimated average effect size but did 
remove four studies below the estimated effect size and estimated an unbiased average effect size (d = 
0.64, 95% CI LL = 0.43, UL = 0.85), which was larger than the original effect size. Egger’s regression 
intercept, however, was nonsignificant, intercept = 0.03, t(24) = 0.02, p = .78. However, this later 
result may be due to low statistical power. The estimated fail-safe N was 258, indicating that the 
rewards–cooperation effect size may be robust. Overall, we conclude that our data did not contain a 
publication bias characterized by systematically missing studies below the average effect size. 
Instead, there was slight bias in the data to underestimate the effects of both rewards and punishments 
on cooperation. 
 
Punishments versus rewards and cooperation 
Although the punishment effect was slightly stronger than the rewards effect, comparing these two 
estimates using a mixed-effects analysis indicated that the effectiveness of punishments and rewards 
did not statistically differ in their impact on cooperation, Q(1) = 2.95, p = .09. Previous research has 
suggested that punishments may be more effective during one-shot dilemmas, whereas rewards may 
be more effective during iterated dilemmas. To examine these perspectives, we considered the relative 
effectiveness of rewards and punishments during either one-shot or iterated dilemmas. During one-
shot interactions, punishments (d = 0.32, 95% CI LL = 0.20, UL = 0.43) did not significantly differ 
from rewards (d = 0.16, 95% CI LL = −0.03, UL = 0.35), Q(1) = 1.92, p = .16, even though the 
punishment effect was statistically significant and the reward effect was not. During iterated 
dilemmas, there was no difference between punishment (d = 0.87, 95% CI LL = 0.74, UL = 0.99) and 
rewards (d = 0.81, 95% CI LL = 0.55, UL = 1.07), Q(1) = 0.15, p = .70. 
 
Moderators 
We now consider the possible moderators of the punishment–cooperation and rewards–cooperation 
effect size distributions. In the following analyses, we consider each possible moderator in turn while 
examining its impact on each relationship, respectively. The results of these moderator analyses on 
the punishment–cooperation and rewards–cooperation effect sizes are reported in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively.  
 
Cost of incentive: Costly versus free 
The punishment–cooperation association was stronger when punishment was costly (d = 0.78, 95% 
CI LL = 0.66, UL = 0.91) compared to when it was free (d = 0.52, 95% CI LL = 0.34, UL = 
0.70), Q(1) = 5.41, p = .02. Similarly, the rewards–cooperation relationship was stronger when 
rewarding was costly (d = 0.97, 95% CI LL = 0.57, UL = 1.37) compared to when it was free (d = 
0.32, 95% CI LL = 0.12, UL = 0.52),Q(1) = 8.07, p = .005. 
 
Incentive system: Decentralized versus centralized 
The punishment–cooperation association was significantly stronger in a decentralized system (d = 
0.78, 95% CI LL = 0.65, UL = 0.91) compared to a centralized system (d = 0.55, 95% CI LL = 
0.38, UL = 0.72), Q(1) = 4.31, p = .03. However, regarding the rewards–cooperation effect size, there 
was no statistical difference between rewards being administered by a centralized (d = 0.50, 95% 
CI LL = 0.23, UL = 0.77) or a decentralized system (d = 0.52, 95% CI LL = 0.24, UL = 0.80), Q(1) = 
0.02, p = .91. 
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Group size 
We coded the size of the group facing the dilemma and use this as continuous measure predicting the 
effect size in meta-regression. Group size did not moderate either the punishment–cooperation 
association, b = −.01, Q(1) = 0.15, p = .70 or the reward–cooperation association, b = .04,Q(1) = 
0.28, p = .35. 
 
Type of experimental design: Partner versus stranger design 
For this analysis, we included only studies that employed the Fehr and Gächter (2000) protocol. The 
punishment–cooperation association was stronger in the partner design (d = 1.02, 95% CI LL = 
0.83, UL = 1.21) than in the stranger design (d = 0.37, 95% CI LL = 0.20, UL = 0.54),Q(1) = 
25.50, p < .001. 
 
One-shot versus iterated dilemmas 
In some experiments on punishment, researchers have participants play a social dilemma repeatedly, 
but during each round, they are randomly assigned with a new group of participants in the dilemma 
(the stranger design). When testing the effect of iterations on the punishment–cooperation effect size, 
we considered the difference among three conditions: (a) iterations with a partner matching design, 
(b) iterations with a stranger design, and (c) one-shot interactions. However, for the rewards–
cooperation relationship, there were no studies that combined iterations with a stranger design, and 
therefore, we can compare iterations only of a partner matching design and one-shot interactions. 
The punishment–cooperation association was stronger in the iterated dilemmas with partner matching 
(d = 0.92, 95% CI LL = 0.78, UL = 1.06) compared to the iterated dilemmas with a stranger design 
(d = 0.62, 95% CI LL = 0.35, UL = 0.90) and the one-shot dilemmas (d = 0.32, 95% CI LL = 
0.21, UL = 0.42), Q(2) = 44.42, p < .02. Similarly, the rewards–cooperation association was stronger 
during iterated dilemmas (d = 0.76, 95% CI LL = 0.50, UL = 1.03) than in the one-shot dilemmas (d = 
0.16, 95% CI LL = −0.03, UL = 0.35), Q(1) = 13.03, p < .001. 
We examined whether the incentives–cooperation association would become stronger with an 
increase in the number of iterations of the dilemma. In a subsequent analysis, we use the number of 
iterations as a continuous variable predicting the effect size in meta-regression. Iterations were 
nonsignificantly related to the effect size distribution for both punishment, b = .005, Q(1) = 3.38, p = 
.06, and rewards, b = .003,Q(1) = 1.10, p = .29. However, this random-effects model may be 
conservative, especially with a small sample of studies. Using a fixed-effects model, there was a 
significant positive effect of iterations on the rewards–cooperation effect size, b = .009, Q(1) = 
6.60, p = .01. 
 
Type of dilemma 
There are three main types of dilemmas represented in our analysis: public goods dilemmas, 
prisoner’s dilemmas, and resource dilemmas. The punishment–cooperation association did not differ 
across the type of dilemma, Q(2) = 1.52, p = .46. Specifically, this effect size did not statistically 
differ between the prisoner’s dilemma (d = 0.54, 95% CI LL = 0.25, UL = 0.84), the public goods 
dilemma (d = 0.74, 95% CI LL = 0.62, UL = 0.85), and the resource dilemma (d = 0.77, 95% CI LL = 
0.38, UL = 1.17). 
However, for the rewards–cooperation association, there was a significant difference between the 
types of dilemmas, Q(2) = 7.80, p = .02. The rewards–cooperation linkage was the strongest in the 
resource dilemma (d = 1.27, 95% CI LL = 0.60, UL = 1.94) compared to the public goods dilemma 
(d = 0.34, 95% CI LL = 0.17, UL = 0.52) and the prisoner’s dilemma (d = 0.11, 95% CI LL = 
−0.45, UL = 0.67). 
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Participant payment: Paid versus not paid 
Punishment was more effective when participants were paid for the outcomes of the dilemma (d = 
0.75, 95% CI LL = 0.64, UL = 0.85) relative to when they were making decisions about hypothetical 
amounts of money (d = 0.31, 95% CI LL = −0.07, UL = 0.69), Q(1) = 4.65, p = .03. The rewards–
cooperation association was marginally significantly larger when participants were paid for their 
decisions (d = 0.59, 95% CI LL = 0.36,UL = 0.82) than not paid for their decisions in the dilemma 
(d = 0.23, 95% CI LL = −0.08, UL = 0.54), Q(1) = 3.30, p = .07. 
Cost-to-fine ratio in punishment studies 
We found that the cost-to-fine ratio did not moderate the punishment–cooperation effect size, Q(3) = 
0.61, p = .89. Specifically, we did not observe a statistical difference in the estimated punishment–
cooperation effect size between conditions when one monetary unit purchased a reduction in one (d = 
0.87), two (d = 0.76), three (d = 0.84), or four (d = 0.90) monetary units of the person punished. 
Country of participants 
When analyzing the effect of punishment on cooperation across countries we considered those 
countries represented by four or more effect sizes. We found that the impact of punishment on 
cooperation varied significantly across countries, Q(7) = 124.61, p < .001. The punishment–
cooperation effect size was strongest in studies from Australia (d = 1.27), Japan (d = 1.07), Israel (d = 
1.03), Switzerland (d = 1.00), the Netherlands (d = 0.77), and the United States (d =0 .62). However, 
punishment had no effect on cooperation in studies conducted in Russia (d= −0.03). 
The rewards–cooperation effect size sample contained much less diversity in countries. We found that 
rewards were more effective at enhancing cooperation in the United States (d = 0.88) than in the 
Netherlands (d = 0.16), Q(1) = 9.78, p = .002. 
Multiple Regression Model 
Some moderators are intercorrelated—for example, there was an exceptionally strong correlation 
between cost of incentives and whether the incentive was centralized or decentralized (r = .83, p < 
.001). To examine such overlapping moderators, we conducted a random-effects multiple regression 
analysis using method of moments estimations with SPSS macros provided by Lipsey and Wilson 
(2001). In this analysis, we combined both punishment and reward effect sizes as the dependent 
variable and included seven predictors of the effect size: (a) type of incentive (punishment vs. 
reward), (b) cost of incentive (free vs. costly), (c) source of incentive (centralized vs. decentralized), 
(d) number of iterations, (e) participant payment (paid vs. not paid), (f) group size, and (g) whether 
the study was conducted by either an economist or psychologist. The model predicted a significant 
amount of variance in the effect size distribution, R2 = .11, Q(7) = 22.90, p = 001. Supporting earlier 
analyses, we found that three variables moderated the effect size: cost of incentive (β = .26, p = .04), 
participant payment (β = .21, p = .02), and iterations (β = .12, p = .08). After controlling for the 
variance explained by these other variables, source of incentives did not moderate the effect 
size.4 Similarly, there was no effect of type of incentive, group size, or whether studies were 
conducted by economists versus psychologists. 
 
Discussion 
 
Using an interdependence-theoretic framework, we proposed that rewards and punishment should 
promote cooperation and identified two variables—cost of incentives and source of incentives—that 
might influence the effectiveness of these incentives in promoting cooperative behavior. A meta-
analysis involving 187 effect sizes revealed that reward and punishment exhibit a substantial and 
                                                     
4
 We also conducted a random-effects multiple regression model including the cost of incentives and source of 
incentives as predictors of the effect size. Again, cost of incentives was the only significant predictor of the 
effect size in this model. 
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statistically equivalent positive effect on cooperation.5 Thus, the main finding is that incentives 
reliably enhance cooperative behavior. Furthermore, we found that the effectiveness of these 
incentives is stronger when the incentives are costly to administer. We suggested earlier that the 
administration of costly incentives might signal a strong commitment to the goal of promoting 
cooperation, rather than simply pursuing self-interest. It is the perceptions of these benevolent 
interpersonal motives that may explain why incentives are more effective to the degree that they are 
more costly to administer. 
We also believed that incentives that were decentralized (i.e., provided by actual participants in the 
cooperative venture) would induce more cooperation than centralized incentives (i.e., those provided 
by external sources). Whereas the meta-analysis provided support for this hypothesis, after 
statistically controlling for cost, centralized and decentralized incentive systems did not significantly 
differ in their impact on cooperation. We also found that punishments were more effective during 
iterated dilemmas when participants continued to interact in the same group, compared to both 
iterated dilemmas with reassignment to a new group after each trial and one-shot dilemmas. The 
incentive–cooperation effect size differed across countries but was found to be unrelated to other 
study characteristics (e.g., group size or the cost-to-fine ratio). 
In what follows, we evaluate the evidence relevant to the hypotheses of interdependence theory, 
discuss some intriguing issues raised by the meta-analysis, and suggest directions for future research. 
We start with the first question raised in this article. 
 
Are Rewards and Punishment Effective Promoters of Cooperation? 
A great deal of research has focused on the role of incentives as tools for promoting cooperation in 
social dilemmas. Incentives can be seen as structural solutions to resolving social dilemmas in that 
they affect the interdependence structure of the social dilemma by reducing the conflicts of interest 
(e.g., Kollock, 1998; Van Lange & Joireman, 2008; Yamagishi, 1986, 1988). We note immediately 
that some investigators have proposed that incentives may energize a set of interrelated psychological 
processes that might reduce cooperation in social dilemmas, including (a) decreasing intrinsic 
motivation for cooperation; (b) undermining feelings of autonomy, control, and freedom; and (c) 
fueling psychological reactance. Thus, a key question drove our investigation: Given that research is 
generally supportive of these psychological mechanisms related to hidden costs of incentives (Lepper 
& Greene, 1978), can incentives effectively increase cooperation? 
In support of Hypothesis 1, the present findings provide unequivocal evidence that rewards and 
punishment are effective promoters of cooperation in social dilemmas, explaining approximately 3%–
12% of the variance in cooperation. We posit that incentives influence cooperation in a structural 
manner, such that the conflicts among group members are reduced. In line with interdependence 
theory (and game theory), people are more likely to cooperate to the degree that the incentives of 
collective interests are enhanced and the incentives for self-interest are reduced (Andenaes, 1971; 
Bankston & Cramer, 1974; Komorita & Parks, 1995; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Zimring, 1971). 
As such, the first contribution of the present meta-analysis is that, although incentives might 
undermine intrinsic motivation and even cooperation in several important ways (e.g., Lepper & 
                                                     
5
 We are the first, to our knowledge, to conduct a comprehensive meta-analytic review of the effect of incentives 
on cooperation. At the same time, we should acknowledge an earlier meta-analysis, conducted by Zelmer 
(2003), which reviewed factors affecting cooperation in public good settings. This meta-analysis provided more 
preliminary evidence, in that the analysis was smaller in scope (27 studies) and included only a few studies in 
which punishment was manipulated. Moreover, nearly all studies included were conducted by behavioral 
economists, and no moderators of the effect sizes were examined. The present meta-analysis complements this 
past work especially by including a much broader sample of studies from both economics and psychology that 
enabled us to test several theoretically interesting moderators. Moreover, the present meta-analysis complements 
recent narrative reviews of incentives and cooperation in both economics (Chaudhuri, 2011) and psychology 
(Shinada & Yamagishi, 2008). 
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Greene, 1978), the costs of these undermining mechanisms are outweighed by incentives reducing the 
conflicts of interest. In other words, reward and punishments effectively increase cooperation. 
 
What Factors Promote the Effectiveness of Reward and Punishment? 
Interdependence theory is highly useful in understanding how social circumstances might magnify the 
effectiveness of incentives. In particular, interdependence theory emphasizes the interpersonal 
motives of a person as well as the interpersonal motives that a person perceives in others. Indeed, we 
have suggested that rewards and punishment are effective when they are associated with the pursuit of 
collective interest, rather than self-interest. In fact, the decision to provide incentives can be viewed as 
a second-order social dilemma: People in the dilemma can either free ride on others’ provision of 
incentives for cooperation or sacrifice self-interest to provide incentives for collective benefit. Indeed, 
modern economic theories and research have provided evidence that inequality aversion can predict 
sacrifice for collective interest in terms of both cooperation (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) and the 
propensity to punish noncooperators (e.g., Fowler, Johnson, & Smirnov, 2005). Although delivering 
incentives typically involves the sacrifice of self-interest for collective benefit, this does not 
necessarily mean that others will always perceive that incentives are directed toward collective benefit 
and the question becomes, What situations enable perceptions that incentives are being administered 
in the pursuit of collective interest? 
 
Cost of incentive 
The meta-analysis provides good support for Hypothesis 2, the prediction that incentives would be 
more effective when the incentives were costly to administer compared to when incentives were free. 
We reasoned from interdependence theory that when individuals receive incentives involving cost to 
the provider, they are more likely to perceive that the provider is relatively more concerned about the 
collective, relative to when incentives are free. In fact, Fehr and Gächter (2002) labeled costly 
punishment altruistic because they demonstrated that people use costly punishment in the absence of 
immediate, material benefits for the self or their current group. If individuals perceive that others 
provide costly incentives to cooperate as a result of cooperative intentions, this may affect other 
downstream psychological processes, such as the formation of expectations of subsequent behavior, 
development of social norms, and formation of positive reputations, all of which may increase 
cooperation. 
Recent research has suggested complementary (and alternative) explanations of why cost of 
incentives moderates their impact on cooperation. Several studies have shown a so-called price effect 
of punishment, such that people punish more when it costs less (C. M. Anderson & Putterman, 2006; 
Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Versterlund, 2003; Carpenter, 2007a; Egas & Riedl, 2008; Ostrom et al., 
1992). A possible implication of more frequent costless incentives is that they heighten the chances of 
receiving incentives and thus may increase cooperation. However, this perspective would predict a 
stronger incentive–cooperation linkage under conditions of costless sanctions—which is at odds with 
the results of this meta-analysis. 
Another implication of the price effect, however, is that low incentive costs may evoke more 
antisocial punishment (e.g., punishment of cooperators by defectors; Cinyabuguma, Page, & 
Putterman, 2005; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2005; Herrmann et al., 2008), whereas high incentive 
costs may make people more thoughtful of when and to whom to provide incentives, leading to more 
well-considered incentive choices. More specifically, costly rewards (punishments) will more 
selectively be delivered to cooperators (defectors). Thus, under conditions of costly incentives, 
perceived fairness of the incentives will be enhanced, and a norm of cooperation may be 
communicated more clearly. Alternatively, a costly incentive from a fellow participant in a dilemma 
may carry additional social reinforcement of the desired behavior, relative to an equivalent incentive 
that is free (Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair & Tucker, 2005). Future research should further examine if 
perceived cooperative intent motives mediate the effect of costly incentives on cooperation, while 
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controlling for alternative explanations, such as the frequency of incentives, fairness of incentives, 
communication of norms, and social reinforcement. 
 
Source of incentive 
In our sample of studies, source of incentives was strongly correlated with the cost of incentives. Past 
research has mostly used paradigms that involve either decentralized and costly incentives or 
centralized and free incentives. When we controlled for the variance in the effect size accounted for 
by cost of incentives, source of incentives did not account for a significant amount of variance in the 
effect size. Hence, Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
One explanation is that centralized sanctioning systems may actually increase cooperation more than 
decentralized sanctioning systems. Earlier, we reasoned that centralized systems may be less effective 
than decentralized systems because (a) an authority who administers incentives can be regarded as 
powerful, (b) people often associate power with self-interest motives (compared to similar status 
others), and (c) people tend to have negative reactions to power asymmetries. At the same time, 
people are often more likely to be influenced by more, compared to less, powerful persons. 
Traditionally, power is defined in terms of the ability to move others through a wide range of 
outcomes (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959), and the abilities to reward others and to punish others form two 
important bases of power and influence (French & Raven, 1959). Complementing these classic 
conceptualizations, more recent research has revealed that feelings of power tend to reinforce the 
influence that power affords (C. Anderson, Keltner, & John, 2003). For example, in negotiations, low-
power individuals concede more to high-power individuals than the other way around (Butt & Choi, 
2010; De Dreu & van Kleef, 2004; Overbeck, Neale, & Govan, 2010; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; van 
Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Also, when groups are unsuccessful in managing a public good 
(Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & Wilke, 1984), then group members see the installation of a leader as a 
fruitful way to solve the free-rider problem (Samuelson, 1991; Yamagishi, 1986). 
In addition, the coding of source of incentives may reflect not only a difference in power or 
centralization but also a difference of personal involvement in the social dilemma. After all, an 
authority (e.g., the experimenter) may be less involved in the social dilemma itself than a typical 
group member (e.g., a participant). Thus, our reasoning that the source of incentives reflects power 
differentials in the dilemma may be confounded with personal involvement. This consideration is 
important because, in decentralized systems, a fellow group member may promote various feelings, 
such as common fate (“we are in this together”) or identity (i.e., he or she is “one of us”) that might 
promote trust (Brewer & Kramer, 1986). In contrast, feelings of common fate or shared identity with 
authorities may be considerably weaker because the personal involvement of authorities is weaker 
than that of the prototypical group member (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Thus, it is plausible that, along 
with differences in power, feelings of common fate and shared identity help people understand 
psychological consequences of centralized and decentralized incentive systems. We encourage 
investigators to manipulate power or centralization while keeping personal involvement constant. 
Such research not only could systematically test how power and centralization affect the extent to 
which incentive systems influence cooperation but also could inform the underlying processes, such 
as the undermining of trust in others, perceived cooperative motives, or perceived fairness of 
incentives. 
Insofar as there was an effect of source of incentive, this effect disappeared, while the effect of cost of 
incentive remained significant. One might speculate that the perceived cost of incentives might to 
some degree override the potential effect of source of incentives. What matters most is not who 
administers the incentives but the intentions that are perceived to underlie the administration of 
incentives. Genuine intentions to safeguard and promote collective interests, rather than self-interest, 
are seemingly more persuasive when such incentives are costly. This finding informs us about the 
importance of designing studies where cost of incentives and source of incentives are orthogonally 
manipulated. The results of such studies will inform theory and may provide relatively concrete 
guidelines as to how to effectively administer rewards and punishments in social dilemmas. 
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Are Rewards and Punishment Equally Effective? 
Earlier research is inconclusive on this topic. Although some studies have reported that rewards are 
more effective than punishment (Komorita & Barth, 1985; McCusker & Carnevale, 1995), other 
studies have suggested that punishment is more effective than reward (Andreoni et al., 2003; 
Rapoport & Au, 2001; Stern, 1976) or that there is no difference between the two incentives in terms 
of effectiveness (Rand et al., 2009; Sefton, Shupp, & Walker, 2007). The results of the meta-analysis 
suggest that rewards and punishment have equivalent main effects on cooperation. Although there is a 
slightly larger effect size estimate of punishment (d = 0.70) than rewards (d = 0.51), this is only 
marginally significant, and the analysis of bias in our sample suggests the rewards–cooperation effect 
size may be underestimated. Therefore, there is no strong empirical reason to conclude that reward 
and punishments differ in their overall effectiveness as motivators of cooperation in social dilemmas. 
Previous theory and research have suggested that punishments should exert a quicker effect on 
behavior compared to rewards (Azrin & Holz, 1966; Driscoll, 2005; Gershoff, 2002; Skinner, 1953). 
Conversely, rewards have been considered to result in better long-term learning than punishments 
(Driscoll, 2005; Gershoff, 2002; Holz & Azrin, 1962; Skinner, 1953). We analyzed the differences 
between reward and punishment in both one-shot and iterated dilemmas. In one-shot dilemmas, 
rewards had a small marginally significant positive effect on cooperation (d = 0.16), whereas 
punishments had a slightly larger significant positive effect on cooperation (d = 0.32), although these 
differences were not statistically significant. Similarly, there was no significant difference between 
rewards and punishment during iterated dilemmas. Therefore, in the context of social dilemmas, there 
is no difference between rewards and punishment as either short-term or long-term promoters of 
cooperation. 
Although the present findings provide strong evidence that rewards and punishments do not 
substantially differ in their impact on cooperation, it may still be that these incentives differentially 
affect either expectations of cooperation, intrinsic motivation, or ethical concerns during social 
dilemmas. More insight into these questions may lead to the conclusion that, despite the fact that 
rewards and punishments increase cooperation to an equal extent, it nevertheless matters which 
incentive system is installed. This is especially true in situations in which cooperation levels depend, 
at least in part, on individuals’ willingness to cooperate or situations in which there might be some 
uncertainty regarding the actual administration of the incentive (e.g., when it is not easy to catch the 
noncooperators). Under these conditions, rewards or punishments may be more or less effective 
depending on their indirect effect on individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and motivations in social 
dilemmas. 
 
Emerging Issues for Future Study: The Psychology and Economics of Incentives 
One benefit of meta-analytic reviews is that they identify areas of empirical investigation that are 
especially promising. Moreover, the current meta-analysis includes studies from different disciplines, 
which gives rise to some intriguing issues relevant to all disciplines that study human cooperation. We 
now discuss the issues of (a) incentives over time, (b) effectiveness versus efficiency of incentives, (c) 
participant payment, (d) and the importance of culture. 
 
Incentives over time: Beyond reinforcement and punishment 
Interestingly, we found that incentives, both reward and punishments, more strongly increased 
cooperation during iterated dilemmas than in one-shot dilemmas and that this association became 
even stronger with increased iterations. So, incentives became more effective over time. At first 
glance, this result highlights the role of incentives in learning cooperation. After all, learning theory 
suggests that, over time, rewards (punishments) will increase (decrease) the probability of subsequent 
sanctioned behavior (Skinner, 1953). In such situations, learning and performance are enhanced over 
time through patterns of positive task feedback on performance. 
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However, the finding that incentives become more effective over time is also in line with an 
interdependence-theoretical perspective. In social dilemmas, incentives generally encourage not only 
one’s motivation to behave cooperatively (i.e., one’s own motives) but also one’s expectations about 
others’ cooperation (i.e., believed or perceived others’ motives). For example, prosocial motives to 
cooperate may not affect cooperation unless the perceivers expect others to cooperate (see Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977), and expectations are strongly influenced by past behavior (e.g., Van Lange, 1999; 
Van Lange, Ouwerkerk, & Tazelaar, 2002). Therefore, incentives may be more effective after several 
trials because people have developed perceived cooperative motives via group members’ sanctioning 
behavior, generating expectations of future cooperation. Similarly, the activation of reputational 
concerns, the development of social norms prescribing cooperation, and the weakening of potentially 
undermining processes (such as feelings of injustice, feelings of being gypped; see Kerr et al., 2009; 
Mulder et al., 2006a; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Yamagishi, 1986) may 
each unfold over time, thereby accounting for longer term rather than immediate effectiveness of 
incentives. Also, the emotions that can be evoked by rewards (e.g., joy, gratitude, and pride) and 
punishment (e.g., anger, guilt, and shame) might affect the duration of their impact by promoting a set 
of positive versus negative cycles of social interaction (e.g., Keltner, van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 
2008). Although such issues are speculative at the moment, they are important as future research may 
help people to understand the psychological processes that underlie the impact of incentives on 
cooperation over time. 
As both individual learning and group processes may explain the differential effects in one-shot and 
iterated dilemmas, we also compared the effectiveness of incentives in a stranger design to both one-
shot and iterated dilemmas using the partner matching design. Recall that, in the stranger design, 
individuals play a dilemma repeatedly but, for each trial, are randomly assigned to a new group of 
partners. If learning is the primary mechanism responsible for incentives’ greater effectiveness during 
iterated dilemmas, then one could expect that (a) the stranger design would have an equally effective 
impact on the punishment–cooperation association, compared to iterated dilemmas with a partner 
matching design, and (b) both the stranger and the partner matching designs would show stronger 
punishment–cooperation effects than one-shot dilemmas. Yet this is not what we found. In fact, the 
partner matching studies with iterations had a larger punishment–cooperation effect size compared to 
the stranger design studies with iterations, which had a larger effect than one-shot dilemma studies. 
These findings suggest that the effect of punishment during iterated dilemmas is not only due to 
learning principles but also due to processes related to group norms, generating expectations of group 
cooperation, and strategically developing reputations (e.g., Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr, 
Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002). Whether this is also the case for rewards remains unclear as we did 
not find studies in which the stranger protocol was employed while studying the impact of rewards on 
cooperation. 
 
Paid versus hypothetical dilemmas 
We were particularly intrigued by the finding that both rewards and punishments were more effective 
when participants were actually paid for their decisions rather than making hypothetical decisions 
without monetary consequences. Similarly, Yamagishi (1988) found that when cooperation was more 
costly for individuals, then punishment was more likely to result in higher levels of cooperation. Two 
simple messages emerge from the current findings. First, the effect of costliness of cooperation on the 
punishment–cooperation association generalizes to the rewards–cooperation association. Second, 
researchers interested in testing theory of the incentives–-cooperation linkage should test these 
hypotheses under conditions of costly cooperation. 
Moreover, it is interesting that disciplines differ in the norms for paying participants (or not). For 
example, in psychology, it is not uncommon to examine social dilemmas involving hypothetical 
outcomes, whereas, in (behavioral) economics, there are stronger norms to examine social dilemmas 
involving actual cash. The present findings suggest the possibility that incentives may matter more 
when the stakes are greater (as for real money). This possibility, could open a new line of research 
because some social dilemma outcomes are indeed material, but many social dilemmas also involve 
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immaterial outcomes (e.g., contributing to a positive group spirit) or intermediate ones, which 
sometimes are quite easy to translate into actual cash (e.g., time and effort). Thus, the current results 
suggest that incentives are more effective in conditions with concrete material outcomes or when 
outcomes are framed according to these material benefits of cooperation. At the same time, future 
research may consider whether incentives are indeed relatively less effective during dilemmas 
involving immaterial outcomes and, if so, how the effectiveness of incentives under these conditions 
can be enhanced. 
 
Incentives and group size 
Group size did not moderate the effect of incentives on cooperation.6 Yamagishi (1992) suggested that 
group size would increase the magnitude of the incentive–cooperation relationship because people are 
more likely to expect others to pursue immediate self-interest and support the incentive system. 
Although there is evidence supporting this line of reasoning, such studies were not included in the 
meta-analysis because they did not examine effects of rewards and punishment on cooperation and 
typically involved relatively large group sizes (e.g., Kerr, 1989). In contrast, our meta-analysis 
included only studies on rewards and punishment, and that body of research typically includes small 
group sizes (where the modal of group size was four persons). Thus, it is still possible that group size 
moderates the effectiveness of punishment when group size is observed across a more extensive 
range. To date, relevant studies have compared relatively small groups (e.g., five- vs. 10-person 
groups: Carpenter, 2007b; Carpenter, Bowles, Gintis, & Hwang, 2009; four- vs. eight-person groups: 
Yamagishi, 1992), and the results are inconclusive. 
One might speculate that the psychological effects of group size become especially pronounced if one 
moves beyond at least five members. For example, according to the core configurations of group size, 
one should move beyond the five-person group to understand the unique adaptive challenges posed by 
larger groups (Caporael, 1997). Compared to relatively small groups (roughly seven members or 
fewer), which are often challenged by concrete forms of cooperation (often face-to-face interactions, 
such as foraging, or working on a common task), larger groups (e.g., 30 members or more) feature 
forms of exchanges (e.g., migration, environmental behavior, or information exchange) that are more 
global, abstract, and less strongly rooted in social interactions yielding concrete team products 
(Brewer & Caporael, 2006; Caporael, 1997). We suggest that one important function of a meta-
analytic review is that it identifies gaps in the literature or domains that have not been fully examined. 
As such, the present research suggests that the study of larger groups may provide important answers 
to the impact of group size on the use and effectiveness of rewards and punishment in social 
dilemmas. 
 
Effectiveness versus efficiency 
As noted earlier, the current meta-analysis leaves little doubt about the effectiveness of rewards and 
punishment. A next, more challenging question is whether these incentives are efficient. Do the 
material gains for the collective outweigh the sum of the material costs of the incentives that are 
administered? Indeed, this question relates to the issue of group efficiency, which has recently been 
addressed in prior research on punishment in particular. It appears that group efficiency is undermined 
shortly after the administration of punishments (e.g., Dreber, Rand, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2008; Egas 
& Riedl, 2008). In particular, there is a reduction in group efficiency with only a few iterations of the 
                                                     
6
 Casari (2005) argued that any difference between punishment behaviors in larger, compared to smaller, groups 
may result from different punishment protocol used in experiments. Specifically, during decentralized 
punishment protocol, researchers either allow a fixed or variable fine-to-fee ratio. In short, Casari noticed that 
the variable fine-to-fee ratio used in these studies creates a condition where it is cheaper to punish defectors in 
larger, compared to smaller, groups, and so, people are more likely to punish in larger groups. We examined the 
effect of group size on the punishment–cooperation relationship in 14 studies that used a fixed fine-to-fee ratio. 
We did not find that group size moderated the effect size. We did not have enough studies that used a variable 
fine-to-fee ratio to test for the association under this condition. 
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dilemma (e.g., 10 iterations or fewer). In these dilemmas, when incentives are added, there is an initial 
decrease in group payoffs, but over iterations, an increase in such payoffs occurs (e.g., Fehr & 
Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008). 
Although various mechanisms are possible, one is that early (and frequent) punishment of 
noncooperators encourages cooperation, which reduces the need for punishment on subsequent trials. 
There is also evidence that the potential for reputation monitoring (Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006), for 
coordination in the provision of incentives (Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010), and for self-chosen 
punishment systems (vs. enforced punishment systems; Gürerk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenbach, 2006) can 
magnify the efficiency of incentives. Thus, there is tentative evidence suggesting that incentives are 
efficient, at least over time, and that several contextual variables need to be examined to understand 
when and why they are especially efficient. Perhaps the most intriguing dilemma is the conflict 
between two pressures: (a) Incentives that are more costly logically undermine efficiency, and (b) 
incentives that are more costly are more effective at increasing cooperation and so may bring about 
more benefits at the collective level. 
 
The importance of culture 
Building on earlier advances (Henrich et al., 2001), recent research has started to examine how 
features of the situation vary in their impact on cooperation across different cultures (e.g., Herrmann 
et al., 2008). The findings of the present meta-analysis, like those of Herrmann et al. (2008), reveal 
that the impact of incentives on cooperation varies significantly between countries. To illustrate, in 
Russian samples (Gächter & Herrmann, 2011; Herrmann et al., 2008), decentralized incentives tend to 
have no impact on cooperation (d = −0.03) and reduce group profits. In many other countries, 
however, punishment has a positive impact on cooperation (e.g., United States d = 0.62) and enhances 
group efficiency. Herrmann and colleagues, in an exceptionally extensive cross-cultural study, found 
that countries varied substantially in their tendency to engage in antisocial (or perverse) punishment, 
that is, the punishment of cooperators by defectors. Among the more plausible accounts of these 
cultural differences is the notion that cultures differ in social norms about how to interact with 
strangers—people outside of informal networks that are studied in these experiments (Gintis, 2008). 
For example, cultures may differ in terms of how much trust they have in strangers (especially their 
generosity) and the desire to communicate the norm to not be excessively generous with strangers. 
Setting aside specific explanations, we regard these findings as important because if we did not have 
such an extensive cross-cultural database, we might have been tempted to generalize our results 
beyond our largely Western sample (Herrmann et al., 2008). For example, the fact that costly 
incentives enhance cooperation, compared to costless incentives, may not extend to the Russian 
sample. Given the limited number of studies in several other countries, we were unable to examine the 
effect of moderators in a sample of each country. For example, certain countries may more or less 
benefit from a centralized, opposed to decentralized, incentive system. Examining such questions will 
undoubtedly make an important contribution. Additionally, future research on culture and cooperation 
should move beyond simply comparing samples from different countries (see Gächter, Herrmann, & 
Thöni, 2010). Instead, this work may profit by comparing samples from different groups of countries 
that have different cultural backgrounds (e.g., ex-communist vs. advanced industrial societies; 
Inglehart & Baker, 2000). This approach may more effectively identify dimensions of culture that 
affect the impact of incentives on cooperation in social dilemmas. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
We should acknowledge at least three limitations of the present research. First, psychologists and 
economists have employed different paradigms in manipulating incentives. For example, whereas 
economists have traditionally used a decentralized system of punishment, psychologists have used a 
centralized system of punishment. It may be that some subtle differences in experimental protocol 
between economists and psychologists may explain the differences observed between certain 
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moderators coded along this divide. Yet we are not overly concerned about this limitation. In fact, we 
coded whether the studies were conducted by either an economist or psychologist and controlled for 
this variable in a multiple regression model predicting the effect size. This factor was not a significant 
moderator. Intriguingly, there is recent evidence suggesting that participants in experiments conducted 
by psychologists versus economists may differ in their interpersonal orientations: Prosocial 
orientation (i.e., the tendency to enhance equality in outcomes and joint outcomes) is the dominant 
orientation among psychology students, whereas individualistic orientation (i.e., the tendency to 
enhance outcomes for self with no or very little regard for others’ outcomes) is the dominant 
orientation among economics students (see Van Lange, Schippers, & Balliet, in press). Such evidence 
is potentially important to understanding how participants might respond to external forces that seek 
to promote cooperation. 
Second, there are fewer studies on rewards than punishments, reducing statistical power to detect 
moderators of the rewards–cooperation association. This is a key area for further investigation. 
Third, some studies were not included in this analysis because they lacked the required statistical 
information to calculate the effect size. Accordingly, we employed a mixed-effects analysis, assuming 
we did not have all studies in the population of studies represented in our sample. A mixed-effects 
analysis is a more conservative test of moderator effects and should provide more confidence that the 
results will generalize across the population of studies. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Reward and punishment, as two distinct incentives, are classic concepts with a long history in 
psychology. They are central in the basics of psychology, providing the conceptual foundation for 
behaviorism and the study of performance and learning. Even though incentives may provide hidden 
costs, such as reduced intrinsic motivation to cooperate, the results of this meta-analysis support the 
position of Hobbes (1651) and Hardin (1968): Incentives do promote cooperation in social dilemmas. 
More interesting, however, is that a generalized learning mechanism thought to underlie the effect of 
incentives on performance and learning may not be an all-encompassing explanation of the effect of 
incentives on cooperation with interdependent others. Punishment was most effective when 
individuals interacted with the same group over several trials, compared to when individuals were 
reassigned to a new group after each trial. Therefore, several other more explicitly social mechanisms 
may underlie the effectiveness of incentives, such as reputation, the communication of social norms, 
and the perceived motives of others in the dilemma. 
Aligned with this perspective, interdependence theory provides an insightful analysis that helps one 
understand how the effectiveness of incentives can be further promoted. This analysis links an 
individual’s psychological processes to the broader interpersonal circumstances in which behavioral 
patterns evolve and are reinforced. Incentives are more effective when incentives are costly. Not only 
is this finding of great theoretical importance, it may be essential to the successful functioning of 
teams, schools, and organizations. After all, these groups are all faced with the basic question, How 
can one promote cooperative behavior among group members? Whether it makes human beings a 
sorry lot or not, rewards and punishments do matter (just as do hopes and fears). Knowing that certain 
individuals provide incentives with the noble intent to advance collective interests, even at a cost to 
themselves, seems a source of inspiration, rather than a source of frustration. 
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